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Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and
neurotypical adults take an agent’s false belief into
account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate
et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587–592 (doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01944.x); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325, 883–885
(doi:10.1126/science.1176170)). These findings constitute
central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between
implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment,
which initially included a replication as well as two
manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding
in 2- to 3-year-olds (N= 48). Therefore, we ran a second
experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the
effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled,
sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This
replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds
(N= 78), but was successful in a sample of adults (N= 115).
In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants
did not correctly anticipate the agent’s action during the
familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when
adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly
limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We
discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as
the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms
of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general.
2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
2rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.5:172273
................................................
1. Introduction
Children at around 4 years of age become able to explain and predict another agent’s behaviour by
imputing mental states such as false beliefs [1,2]. This milestone in Theory of Mind (ToM) development,
measured via the child’s response to a test question, is preceded by spontaneous appreciation of an
agent’s false belief. As indicated by their gaze behaviour, children younger than 4 take an agent’s false
belief into account, before they can answer the test question correctly [3,4].
This dissociation is the empirical basis of current theoretical accounts that distinguish between an
implicit and an explicit ToM [5–8]. According to these accounts, children acquire an explicit ToM around
age 4, which allows them to deliberately consider an agent’s mental state to infer reasons for his or her
action. Yet, already infants have an implicit sensitivity to others’ minds, which enables them to process
others’ mental states in a spontaneous, unconscious, fast, but rigid manner. It is supposed that—after
the acquisition of an explicit ToM—both processing modes co-exist throughout life and are employed to
flexibly process others’ and one’s own mental states.
To date, the nature of the early competence to implicitly process false beliefs is heavily disputed
[9–12]. In this study, we started off with the aim of identifying determinants of implicit false belief
sensitivity in young children. Because of its theoretical relevance, we employed the anticipatory looking
paradigm by Southgate et al. [13]. In this eye-tracking version of a change-of-location false belief task, the
authors showed that at 25 months old, children already proactively predict an agent’s false belief-based
action. Using the same paradigm, Senju et al. [14] found that, while neurotypical adults show the same
spontaneous false belief sensitivity, adults with autism spectrum condition fail to systematically predict
the agent’s false belief-based action.
We re-modelled the stimuli of Southgate et al. [13] and added additional conditions to pursue
our research questions. In brief, in our first experiment, we failed to replicate the original finding
and so had no good basis for investigating the effect of our manipulations. Although we adhered
very closely to Southgate et al.’s procedure, the introduction of the new conditions caused some
minor deviation. This led us to conduct a second experiment for the sole goal to see whether
the results by Southgate et al. with children and Senju et al. [14] with neurotypical adults can be
found in a tightly controlled replication. Because the findings of both original studies constitute
an essential pillar of current theories on implicit and explicit ToM, we aimed to find the reported
effect of spontaneous false belief sensitivity in a sufficiently large sample of 25-month-old children
and adults.
Our first experiment was an overly ambitious attempt at investigating one particularly relevant
factor that helps to explain why young children show some sensitivity to an agent’s false belief in
their anticipatory looking for the agent’s behaviour before they can give firm answers about the agent’s
behaviour.
Initial studies of anticipatory looking in false belief contexts used a slight variation of the traditional
unexpected transfer false belief task [1]. For instance, Clements & Perner [3] acted out a story for children
about the mouse Sam. Sam’s quarters had two exits, A and B. In front of each, there was a container. If
Sam needed something from a container, he would come out through the respective exit. This allowed
monitoring of children’s eye gaze in expectation of where Sam would exit (anticipatory looking) in
addition to the traditional measure of asking children where Sam would come out. On the test trials,
Sam mistakenly thought that his piece of cheese was still in Box A, when children knew that it had been
moved to B. For young 3-year-olds, the two measures strongly dissociated. When told that Sam would
soon appear to look for his cheese, the majority of these children looked at exit A. But, when asked, they
said that Sam would come out at B.
The original study [3] also tested children below the age of 3 years and found no evidence for false
belief processing in anticipatory looking. However, Southgate et al. [13] reported such sensitivity for
children as young as 2 years with several interesting changes to the original study. (1) Instead of a story
character exiting from different locations, a person watching part of the scene over a screen used her left
or right hand to reach for the object through different doors in the screen. (2) Children were not told a
story but had to infer and anticipate actions on the basis of what they observed: (a) that the person was
reaching in order to retrieve the object from one of the boxes in front of each door and (b) the imminent
action was signaled by the two doors flashing briefly, accompanied by a chime. (3) In the test conditions,
the person observed the object was put inside one of the boxes, was distracted by a phone call, and
did not witness how the object was moved briefly to the other box and then removed from the scene.
This made it similar to the ‘disappear condition’ used by Wimmer & Perner [1], which led to better
performance in the traditional verbal task.
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The objective of our first experiment was to investigate the importance of factor (3), because an
inability to inhibit the attraction of the object’s actual location has been widely seen as the reason for
young children’s problems with the standard task [9,15,16]. We approached this goal by using Southgate
et al.’s [13] paradigm and contrasted their disappear condition with one where the object remained in
the last box. We also wanted to see whether children’s looking might be swayed by surface features of
the task when they have no rational basis to expect the hand to appear through one or the other door.
Thus, we introduced a knowledge control (KC) condition where the person knew that the object had
disappeared from the scene.
The objective of our second experiment was to replicate Southgate et al. [13] and Senju et al. [14] in
a sufficiently powered experiment, following the method of the original studies as closely as possible.
We reasoned that if spontaneous false belief sensitivity, indicated by anticipatory looking, is a robust and
generalizable phenomenon in children and adults, we should find this previously observed effect.
2. Experiment 1
With the aim of gaining further insight into the structure and solidity of children’s implicit sensitivity
to false beliefs, we presented 2- to 4-year-olds with Southgate et al.’s [13] false belief condition (condition
FB2 in the original paper)1 and added a false belief present (FBP) and a KC condition. All three conditions
were based on the original procedure in which an actor watched a puppet storing an object in one of
two containers. After the actor was distractedly looking away, the puppet first transferred the object
from one container to another, but then left the scene with it. In one condition, we exactly followed
this original procedure and as the object was no longer in any container we called it false belief disappear
(FBD) condition (the detailed description of the FBD condition can be found in electronic supplementary
material, appendix A).
In the other two videos, we also followed the original procedure with the exception that the object did
stay in the container after the transfer (FBP) or that the person witnessed the transfer and the removal and
therefore knew that the object had disappeared (KC). In addition to gaze recording, we asked children
an explicit question after they saw the false belief videos: ‘Where will the hand appear?’ The data of
Experiment 1 is available on https://osf.io/feg6u/.
As the two new conditions could only play their intended role of clarifying the nature of early implicit
ToM if the FBD condition had replicated, we refrain from further reporting them. However, due to the
FBD task being part of a within subjects design some methodological details of those conditions need to
be reported.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Forty-eight 2- to 3-year old children participated in the study (Mage = 31.7 months, range = 20.8–41.5,
25 female). Three additional children were tested but had to be excluded due to experimenter error (1),
technical problems (1) or less than 20% gaze data recorded (1). Participants were recruited and tested
in six different day-care centres in Salzburg, Austria. Parents gave informed written consent and the
children received gifts for their participation.
2.1.2. Exclusion criteria
We applied the same exclusion criteria as described by Southgate et al. [13]: (1) no correct anticipation of
action by the second familiarization trial, (2) looked away at the crucial moment of the test trial and (3)
did not look at either door on the test trial.
1In the original study by Southgate et al. [13]; same in Senju et al. [14] two versions of false belief test trials were tested. The false
belief trial used in Experiments 1 and 2 corresponds to the false belief 2 condition of the original study. In the false belief 1 condition,
the actor witnessed the transfer of the object from the left- to the right-hand box but did not witness its removal from the scene. In
the false belief condition 2, the actor witnesses neither the transfer nor the removal. Because the false belief 2 condition is closer to the
classical object transfer false belief test [1], because it is less open to alternative rule-based explanations of false belief-congruent looking
behaviour, and because Southgate et al. [13] found no difference in anticipatory looking between those two versions, we decided to
only implement false belief condition 2.
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Figure 1. Experiment 1: stimuli examples. Children originally participated in three experimental conditions, each presented in a different
setting (actress, agent, toy, colour of stage).
2.1.3. Design and stimuli
In a within-participants design, each child saw three videos—one per condition—in a partially
counterbalanced order. While the position of the two false belief conditions was fully counterbalanced,
the control condition was always presented as the second video. Each condition was presented in one
out of three video settings that otherwise differed only in superficial elements. The colour of the stage
(purple, green, blue), puppet (sheep, dog, goose), object (carrot, flower, ball) and actress (three different
actresses, figure 1) were kept constant in each set. Condition (FBD, FBP and KC) and direction of transfer2
in the test trial (right to left/left to right) were counterbalanced.
Overall, 18 videos (six conditions in three different settings) were produced in the AV-Studio of the
University of Salzburg. We modelled the stimuli closely to the original material by Southgate et al. [13].
Analogous to Southgate et al. [13], two familiarization trials preceded the test trial in each condition. The
familiarization trials served to acquaint children to an audio-visual cue (chime and flashing of doors,
approx. 1 s long), which preceded the agents’ reaching action, and to make them understand that the
agent is reaching for the object. The time window for gaze data analysis started at the onset of the cue
and ended 1750 ms later. Our test trials differed from Southgate et al.’s [13] procedure in so far as they did
not show the actor’s reaching action to allow for an explicit question and to avoid influencing children’s
response on the subsequent trials. In the test trial, the video stopped 1750 ms after the offset of the cue
and was replaced by an image of the last frame. In both false belief conditions, children were then asked
by the experimenter to tell or indicate on the screen ‘where the hand will appear’. Choices of the door
congruent with the actors’ false belief were coded as correct answers, choices of the incongruent door as
incorrect answers.
2.1.4. Apparatus and procedure
We used a Tobii Pro X2-60 eye tracker (60 Hz sampling rate) [17]. The participants sat on a chair in front
of the integrated 23-inch TFT screen (1600 × 900 pixel) at a distance of approximately 60 cm. Stimuli were
presented and gaze was recorded with Tobii Studio 3.3.1 [17]. The eye tracker’s position was individually
adjusted via a flexible monitor arm. Children sat on their teacher’s lap and completed the inbuilt 5-point
calibration procedure before the experiment started.
2.1.5. Data analysis and measures
Fixations were defined using the standard fixation filter of Tobii Studio 3.2 (velocity threshold: 35
pixels/door; distance threshold: 35 pixels). To extract gaze data of the anticipatory phase in the
familiarization and test trials, we defined (1) time segments and (2) areas of interest (left- and right-
hand door). We refer to the belief-congruent door as correct door and the other door as incorrect door.
Tobii Studio statistics tool was used to extract two measures of interest: the location of first fixation and
fixation duration on each door. We added a differential looking score (DLS) as a third measure. The
DLS was calculated for fixation durations in the total anticipatory period. Therefore, the sum of the total
duration of fixations on the incorrect door was subtracted from the sum of the total fixation duration of
2The objects’ first position (right versus left) alternated between first familiarization, second familiarization and test trial (left/right/left
versus right/left/right).
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fixations on the correct door. This was then divided by the sum of the total duration of fixations on both
doors. For statistical analyses, IBM SPSS Statistics 22 [18] was used. The significance level for all analyses
was p≤ 0.05, two tailed. For a detailed description of the analysis, see electronic supplementary material,
appendix B.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Confirmatory analysis
We follow the original analysis by Southgate et al. [13]. Out of 48 children, 28 children (58.4%) had to be
excluded because they did not anticipate the actor’s action in the second familiarization trial (27, with 17
looking at the incorrect door) or did not look at either door on the test trial (1). To analyse whether an
overall low interest in our task implementation could account for the low correct action anticipation rates
in the second familiarization trial, we checked if participants who failed to meet this criterion had lower
overall gaze rates (% gaze data recorded throughout the whole session) when compared with those who
correctly anticipated the action in the second familiarization trial.
Mean percentage of overall gaze data recorded throughout the whole session did not differ between
children who anticipated correctly (M= 78.2%, s.d. = 17.5%) and those who anticipated incorrectly
(M= 84.6%, s.d. = 11.8%, t46 = 1.52, p= 0.134, Cohen’s d= 0.43). The following analysis is based on the
final sample of 20 children (Mage = 32.8 months, s.d. = 4.7, 13 female). Seven children directed their
first fixation towards the correct door (p= 0.263, binomial test, chance level of 0.5). No difference in
performance was found regarding the direction of transfer (first/last placement of ball in left/right
box, p= 1, Fisher’s exact test), task order (first or third position, p= 0.356, Fisher’s exact test) or context
(version of video, χ2 (2, N= 20) = 0.32, p= 0.851, ΦCramer = 0.13).
We further analysed looking time for each door during the anticipatory period. A repeated measures
ANOVA with door (correct versus incorrect) as a within-participant factor showed no difference in
looking times towards the correct (M= 343 ms, s.d. = 425 ms) when compared with the incorrect door
(M= 542 ms, s.d. = 379 ms), F1,19 = 1.51, p= 0.233, η2p = 0.07. No significant interaction effects were found
when adding direction of transfer, F1,18 = 3.56, p= 0.076, η2p = 0.17, task order,3 F1,18 = 0.24, p= 0.631,
η2p = 0.01, or context, F2,17 = 0.27, p= 0.768, η2p = 0.08, as a between-participants factor.
To test without carry-over effects from prior tasks, we repeated the analysis with those 10 children
who had the FBD condition as the first task in the session. In this subsample 2, children directed their
first fixation towards the correct door (p= 0.344, binomial test, chance level of 0.5). No difference in
performance was found regarding the direction of transfer (p= 1, Fisher’s exact test) or context, χ2
(2, N= 10) = 0.08, p= 0.961, ΦCramer = 0.09. The repeated measures ANOVA showed a non-significant
result when comparing looking time to the incorrect (M= 464 ms, s.d. = 362 ms) and correct door
(M= 346 ms, s.d. = 357 ms), F1,9 = 0.38, p= 0.552, η2p = 0.04. Again, no significant effect was found when
adding direction of transfer or context as a between-participants factor, F1,8 = 1.60, p= 0.241, η2p = 0.17;
F1,7 = 0.124, p= 0.885, η2p = 0.03, respectively.
2.2.2. Differential looking score
Although the one-sample t-test against zero showed a tendency for longer looking at the incorrect
door, the mean DLS of −0.33 (s.d. = 0.74) did not differ significantly from chance, t19 =−1.98, p= 0.062,
Cohen’s d= 0.44. In the subsample of those children who watched the FBD condition first, the DLS
(M=−0.29, s.d. = 0.75) did again not differ from chance, t9 =−1.23, p= 0.25, Cohen’s d= 0.39.
2.2.3. Explicit question
Out of the 20 children included in the final sample seven did not respond to the explicit question, seven
indicated the incorrect and six the correct door. No association was found between explicit answers and
the first fixation in the test trial (p= 0.592, Fisher’s exact test). The interaction of the within-participants
variable looking times and the between-participants variable explicit answer correct/incorrect was
non-significant, F1,11 = 1.66, p= 0.224, η2p = 0.13.
3The marginally significant interaction between direction of transfer and door results from children looking longer to the incorrect
door when the object was transferred from the right- to the left-hand box (child’s perspective) than from left to right. The electronic
supplementary material includes a detailed analysis of the side bias.
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2.2.4. Analysis of familiarization trials for all conditions
To measure understanding of the agent’s false belief, it is imperative that the familiarization phase makes
clear to children that the agent wants the object and will reach for it under standard conditions, i.e. no
false belief. This condition is met if children anticipate the agent’s action correctly on familiarization
trials. To see whether any children had this basic understanding, we looked at familiarizations of all
three conditions. Across the six familiarization trials, participants did not show above chance looking to
the correct door (p-values ranging between 0.135 and 1, binomial test, chance level of 0.5), nor did they
show significant improvement across the six trials, Cochran’s Q (5)= 8.194, p= 0.146. Nevertheless, we
analysed the false belief test data (FBD) of those eight children who anticipated correctly on more than
three familiarization trials. Only three children anticipated correctly on test and two of them also looked
longer at the correct window. Still, one could argue that no systematic anticipatory looking should be
expected for the first familiarization trials of each condition because each condition used new materials
and characters. Therefore, we looked at the performance in the false belief trials of those six children who
showed correct anticipatory looking in all three of the second familiarization trials (complete gaze data
for all second familiarizations as well as for the FBD test trial were available for overall 28 children). In
the test trial of the FBD condition, only one child anticipated correctly whereas five children looked to
the incorrect window. Results for fixation duration were the same. This suggests that children, who are
most likely to have understood that the agent wants to reach for the object, focus on the window above
the last location of the object in the test trial.
2.3. Discussion
As in our sample, compared to Southgate et al. [13], fewer children showed reliable anticipatory looking
in the familiarization trials we need to consider potential factors accounting for this discrepancy. There
are small deviations in our video material. First, we did not freeze the picture of the actor in the crucial
moment of the test trial.4 Although 10 naive adults’ ratings of the final scene about which of the two
doors the person would open did not deviate from chance in any of the six FBD videos (p’s ranging
between 0.754 and 0.109), we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that subtle motion cues of the actor
could have influenced children’s gaze.
Second, when checking the familiarization trials, we found that the time intervals between onset of
the chime/flash and opening of the door varied between 1903 and 3313 ms. In Southgate et al. [13],
this period was exactly timed to 2750 ms (1-second-long chime/flash plus 1750 ms until the opening of
the door). It is therefore possible that the unreliable time intervals within familiarizations impeded the
process of forming an association between the audio-visual cue and the action. Another possibility is that
some children might have formed such an association for a longer delay and therefore they did not show
anticipatory looks in the critical period in the test trial (within 1750 ms after the onset of the chime).
3. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 is a replication attempt adhering to a protocol for replication studies by Brandt et al.
[19]. We tried to replicate previous findings on spontaneous false belief attribution in a sample of 25-
month-old children [13] and in a sample of healthy adults [14]. We aimed at sample sizes that are
2.5 times larger than those of the original studies. The aspired number of participants included in the
final analysis was at least N= 50 for the sample of 25-month-olds and N= 43 for the adult sample. We
hereby followed the recommendation by Simonsohn [20] to protect previously observed effects from
underpowered replication attempts. Experiment 2 was preregistered at the Open Science Framework
(OSF). The preregistration protocol, stimuli, datasets and analysis protocols are available on https://osf.
io/feg6u/. Following best practice recommendations, we reported how we determined our sample size,
all data exclusions, all manipulations and all measures in the study [21].
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
A total of seventy-eight 25-month-old children took part in the study (Mage = 25 months 15 days,
range = 23 months 23 days to 26 months 7 days; 39 female). They were recruited via birth records and
4This is not mentioned in Southgate et al.’s [13] paper. After watching the original videos frame by frame we detected this detail.
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Table 1. Experiment 2: number of included and excluded participants per sample, split for exclusion criteria.
25-month-olds N (%)a adults N (%)a
participants tested 78 115
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
included in final analyses 17 (21.8) 54 (47.0)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
exclusion criteriab:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) familiar with task — 3 (2.6)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) history of neurological or psychiatric disorder — 7 (6.1)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(3) less than 20% gaze data recorded 3 (3.8) 3 (2.6)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(4) no correct action anticipation by the 2nd fam. trial 51 (65.4) 29 (25.2)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(5) looked away at crucial moment of the test trial 1 (1.3) —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(6) did not look at either window on the test trial 6 (7.7) 19 (16.5)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aPercentage of total number of tested participants.
bIf multiple reasons for exclusion were applicable to a participant, the criteria were assigned in the order above.
received gifts for their participation. Their parents gave informed written consent and received monetary
compensation for their participation. Seventy-one out of these children were tested at the Babylab at
LMU Munich. The other seven children were tested at University of Salzburg. Note that this deviates
from the preregistration protocol in which a final sample of 25 children should have been tested at
each site. Owing to the unexpected high exclusion rates, we decided to stop data acquisition after an
evaluation of the cost–benefit ratio (for details, see Results and Discussion).
The second sample comprised 115 adults (Mage = 23.1 years, range = 18–41; 47 female; due to an
experimenter error, birthdates from two participants are missing). All participants were tested at LMU
Munich. They were contacted via mailing lists or recruited in courses or directly on campus. They
received monetary compensation.
3.1.2. Exclusion criteria
We applied the same exclusion criteria to our samples as described by Southgate et al. [13]. Additionally,
we had to exclude participants from the adult sample because they were familiar with the task or because
they had a history of neurological or psychiatric condition (excluded before data analysis, table 1).
Further, participants for whom less than 20% gaze data were recorded during the test session were
excluded. If multiple reasons for exclusion were applicable to a participant, the criteria were assigned
in the following order: (1) familiar with task, (2) history of neurological or psychiatric condition, (3)
less than 20% gaze data were recorded, (4) no correct anticipation of action outcome by the second
familiarization trial, (5) looked away at crucial moment of the test trial, (6) did not look at either door on
the test trial.
3.1.3. Stimuli
We modelled the stimuli as closely as possible to the original material by Southgate et al. [13]. Again, the
original video examples served as templates for re-enacting the scene (figure 2). Based on a second-by-
second transcript, we re-modelled the actions of the puppet and the actor. For details, see the transcript
provided at https://osf.io/h5ptd/ and electronic supplementary material, appendix A. In stimulus
preparation, we took care to present the same type and number of ostensive cues displayed by the puppet
and the actor (e.g. direct gaze, waving and smiling).
This time, we tried to re-model the timings of the anticipatory phase as closely as possible. Just like
in the original videos, we introduced a delay of 1750 ms from the offset of the audio-visual cue (chime
and flashing of doors) to the opening of the door. Focusing on this period, we overlooked that our audio-
visual cue was 2 s long instead of a duration of 1 s in the original stimuli. This, in combination with an
inconsistency between timings of the original videos and their description in Southgate et al. [13],5 led
to a deviation of our stimuli from the original ones. In Southgate et al.’s [13] videos, the children were
5Unlike it seemed from the timing of the original videos, the 1750 ms long gaze data analysis interval started with the onset (and not
the offset) of the audio-visual cue.
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(a)  first familiarization trial
(b) second familiarization trial
(c)  false belief test trial
Figure 2. Experiment 2: trial overview. Still frames depicting key events in the first (a) and second (b) familiarization trial and in the false
belief test trial (c). The still frames with the yellow border resemble the anticipatory period from which gaze data were obtained.
familiarized with a 1 s long audio-visual cue, followed by a 1750 ms long delay phase until the observer
opened one of the doors. Thus, they learned that 2.75 s after the onset of the audio-visual cue, the crucial
action took place. In our videos, this interval was 3.75 s long (2 s long audio-visual cue plus 1750 ms delay
phase). Yet, in both studies, the critical interval for the analysis of anticipatory looking was 1750 ms and
began with the onset of the audio-visual cue. We evaluate a potential impact of this deviation on our
results in the Discussion of Experiment 2.
To counterbalance the direction of transfer (left to right versus right to left), half of the participants
watched a horizontally flipped version of the two familiarization trials and the test trial. Before each trial,
an attention grabber was presented. In this 1 s long video the screen turned red and a chime (different
from the one in the test trial) sounded.
Note that in the study by Senju et al. [14], participants saw two additional slightly varied
familiarization trials to increase the likelihood that participants learn about the actor’s goal to retrieve
the ball and the contingency between the door flashing/chime and the subsequent opening of one of the
doors. We reasoned that if two trials sufficiently familiarized 25-month-olds in the study by Southgate et
al. [13], two familiarization trials would also be enough for our adult sample.
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3.1.4. Apparatus and procedure
The laboratory at LMU Munich used a Tobii T60 eye tracker (60 Hz sampling rate) [17]. The participants
sat in front of the integrated 17-inch TFT screen (1280 × 1024 pixel) at a distance of approximately 60 cm.
Stimuli were presented and gaze was recorded with Tobii Studio 3.2 [17]. The eye tracker’s position
was individually adjusted via a flexible monitor arm. The 25-month-old children sat on a high chair
or on the lap of their parent (in that case the parent wore blackened sunglasses). Adult participants
sat on a chair. Participants completed the inbuilt 5-point calibration procedure before the experiment
started.
The laboratory at University of Salzburg used the same apparatus as described in Experiment 1.
Procedures were identical between Salzburg and LMU with the exception that in Salzburg, instead of
wearing glasses, the teacher or the parent was asked to close the eyes during calibration to ensure that
the eye tracker recorded the child’s and not the adult’s gaze. Both laboratories used the same Tobii Studio
project for stimulus presentation, data acquisition and data preprocessing.
3.1.5. Data analysis and measures
The analysis of the eye-tracking data is identical to Experiment 1 and described in detail in electronic
supplementary material, appendix B. In this experiment, we added differential looking score (DLS) as a
third measure in addition to first fixation and looking time. The DLS was calculated for fixation durations
in the total anticipatory period. Therefore, the sum of the total duration of fixations on the incorrect door
was subtracted from the sum of the total fixation duration of fixations on the correct door. This was then
divided by the sum of the total duration of fixations on both doors. For statistical analyses, IBM SPSS
Statistics 24 [18] was used. The significance level for all analyses was p≤ 0.05.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Confirmatory analysis
In this section, we report the analyses that correspond to those from the original papers by Southgate et
al. [13] and Senju et al. [14]. A challenge for this replication attempt was the unexpected high exclusion
rate of participants when criteria by Southgate et al. [13] were applied. From our adult sample, 53.0% had
to be excluded from the final analysis. From the tested 25-month-old children, 78.2% had to be excluded.
As we sought to have at least 50 25-month-olds and 43 adults in the final sample of included participants,
we had to continue with testing participants until these sample sizes were met. These surprisingly high
exclusion rates led to the decision to stop data acquisition for our sample of 25-month-olds. A total
of 230 children would have been necessary to get to the final sample of 50 included participants. We
reasoned that such a high exclusion rate precludes a solid interpretation of any results, irrespective of
whether effects are replicated or not. Out of cost–benefit ratio evaluations, we refrained from testing
additional 25-month-olds. Table 1 shows the number of included and excluded participants in each
sample, split for each inclusion criterion. Remarkably, many participants had to be excluded because
they did not anticipate the actor’s action in the second familiarization trial (65.4% of tested 25-month-
olds; 25.2% of tested adults). Analogously to Experiment 1, we checked if participants who failed to
correctly anticipate the agent’s action in the second familiarization trial had lower overall gaze rates than
the finally included participants (calculated with the sample of the exploratory analysis, for details see
below). For the 25-month-olds, this was not the case: children who passed (M= 87.6%, s.d. = 13.0%) and
failed (M= 83.4%, s.d. = 17.1%) the original criterion did not differ in overall gaze rates, t56 =−0.90,
p= 0.372, Cohen’s d=−0.24. The same was found in the adult sample, t73 = 1.58, p= 0.118, Cohen’s
d= 0.37 (passed: M= 87.5%, s.d. = 10.9%; failed: M= 91.2%, s.d. = 8.3%).
3.2.1.1. Twenty-five-month-olds
The confirmatory analysis is based on the final sample of 17 included children (Mage = 25 months 11
days, range = 23;23–26;5; eight female). In the anticipatory period, 6 out of these 17 children directed
their first fixation towards the correct door (p= 0.332, binomial test, chance level of 0.5). We further
analysed the looking time for each door during the anticipatory period. A repeated measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with door (correct versus incorrect) as within-participants factor revealed that
the 25-month-olds looked significantly longer to the incorrect door (M= 721 ms, s.d. = 541 ms) than to
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Figure 3. Experiment 2: results of confirmatory analysis. The graphs showmeans (±s.e.m.) for the threemeasures of interest, separated
for 25-month-old children and adults. For location of first fixation, adults revealed a significant looking bias for the upcoming false belief-
congruent action. They also looked significantly longer at the correctwhen comparedwith the incorrect door. By contrast, children looked
significantly longer at the incorrect door. No significant effects were found for the DLS.
the correct door (M= 255 ms, s.d. = 721 ms), F1,16 = 6.67, p= 0.020, η2p = 0.30. Finally, for the DLS, a one-
sample t-test against zero showed that 25-month-old children had no looking bias towards the correct
door. The mean DLS of −0.24 (s.d. = 0.83) did not differ significantly from chance, t16 =−1.20, p= 0.247,
Cohen’s d= 0.29. The electronic supplementary material provides additional analyses to check for side
biases in gaze patterns, depending on the direction of transfer (which was counterbalanced between
participants). In short, the three employed measures revealed no side bias in gaze behaviour of the final
sample of 25-month-olds.
3.2.1.2. Adults
A total of 54 adults could be included in the final analysis (Mage = 23.3 years, range = 18–41; 21 female).
Thirty-six out of these 54 participants correctly anticipated that the actor would open the door leading to
the box in which she falsely believed that the ball would be located (p= 0.020, binomial test, chance level
of 0.5). For looking times on the doors during the anticipatory period, a repeated measures ANOVA
with the within-participants factor door (correct versus incorrect) showed a significant difference
between looking times to the correct versus incorrect door, F1,53 = 4.36, p= 0.042, η2p = 0.76. The included
adults looked longer to the correct (M= 393 ms, s.d. = 365 ms) than to the incorrect door (M= 240 ms,
s.d. = 290 ms). For the DLS (M= 0.19, s.d. = 0.83), a one-sample t-test against zero indicated a trend
towards a significant looking bias towards the correct door, t53 = 1.71, p= 0.093, Cohen’s d= 0.23. Figure 3
displays means for each sample and measure of the confirmatory analysis. Also our final adults sample
showed no systematic preference for the left or right side of the screen (see the electronic supplementary
material).
3.2.2. Exploratory analysis
In this post hoc exploratory analysis, we included those 25-month-olds who did not correctly anticipate
the actor’s action in the second familiarization trial. We did this because Wang & Leslie [22] recently
reported a replication of false belief-congruent anticipatory looking as reported by Southgate et al. [13]
in a sample of 2- to 3-year-olds and adults where the original exclusion criterion was not applied.
3.2.2.1. Twenty-five-month-olds
Including 25-month-olds who did not correctly anticipate the actor’s action in the second familiarization
trial, but fixated the door AOI(s) in the test trial, led to a sample size of 58 children for this analysis. Yet,
also with this more lenient exclusion procedure, still only 28 out of these 58 children firstly fixated the
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Figure4. Experiment 2: results of exploratory analysis. In this analysis, also participantswhodidnot correctly predict the agent’s action in
the second familiarization trial, but who fixated the door AOI(s) in the test trial, were included. In this analysis, adults looked significantly
longer to the correct than to the incorrect door. In all other measures, no significant effects were observed.
correct door in the anticipatory period (p= 0.896, binomial test, chance level of 0.5). Their looking times
on the doors did not significantly differ between the correct (M= 482 ms, s.d. = 423 ms) and incorrect
door (M= 460 ms, s.d. = 457 ms), F1,57 = 0.05, p= 0.832, η2p = 0.001 (repeated measures ANOVA with
within-participants factor correct versus incorrect door). Furthermore, also the exploratory analysis of
the DLS (M= 0.10, s.d. = 0.83) revealed no significant looking bias towards the correct door, t57 = 0.90,
p= 0.374, Cohen’s d= 0.12, one-sample t-test against zero.
3.2.2.2. Adults
Including adults who fixated the door(s) in the false belief test trial, but who did not predict the
actor’s action in the second familiarization trial, led to a sample of 75 participants. In this exploratory
analysis, 46 out of the 75 adults directed their first fixation in the anticipatory period towards the correct
door. Unlike in the confirmatory analysis, this distribution differed only marginally significantly from
chance (p= 0.064, binomial test, chance level of 0.5). Consistent with the confirmatory analysis, the
repeated measures ANOVA with door (correct versus incorrect) as within-participants factor yielded
that adults looked significantly longer to the correct (M= 406 ms, s.d. = 391 ms) than to the incorrect
door (M= 247 ms, s.d. = 285 ms), F1,74 = 6.07, p= 0.016, η2p = 0.08. Finally, also in the exploratory analysis
of the DLS, the one-sample t-test against zero indicated a marginally significant looking bias (M= 0.16,
s.d. = 0.83) towards the correct door, t74 = 1.71, p= 0.092, Cohen’s d= 0.20. Figure 4 displays means for
each sample and measure of the exploratory analysis.
3.2.3. Attention to observer
We additionally checked whether the participants’ anticipatory looking was related to attention deployed
to the observer whose belief they were supposed to track. It could be that, in contrast to other paradigms
without a second agent (e.g. [23]), the interactive puppet pulled attention away from keeping track of the
observer’s visual access. It appears that this is possible because the puppet interacts in a conventional
way with the audience, and participants may conceive of the procedure as an interactive puppet show,
waiting for the puppet to continue the interaction, rather than keeping track of the observer’s visual
access and subsequent reaching actions.
If this were the case, we should find a relationship between the amount of fixations of the observer
prior to the anticipatory period and our measures of interest in the test trial. We defined a time
segment that started with the first frame the puppet appeared on the scene and ended with the last
frame the puppet was visible before it left (57.8 s). For this segment, an AOI covering the observer
was drawn (355 × 390 pixels). Subsequently, the number of fixations for this AOI and time interval
was extracted as dependent variable. For 25-month-olds, a binary logistic regression with first fixation
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score as dichotomous outcome variable was performed. The number of fixations of the observer prior
to the anticipatory period was entered as independent variable. The logistic regression model was
not significant, χ2(1) = 0.03, p= 0.853 (Nagelkerke R2 < 0.01). The number of fixations to the observer
(M= 13.9, s.d. = 8.0) could not predict whether 25-month-olds correctly anticipated her subsequent
action. For the adults, an analogous binary logistic regression was performed. Also for this sample, the
model was not significant, χ2(1) = 0.02, p= 0.964 (Nagelkerke R2 < 0.01). Thus also in adults, the number
of fixations to the observer (M= 20.1, s.d. = 8.3) was not predictive for following false belief-congruent
action anticipations.
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to answer the question whether we could replicate the effect of false belief
sensitivity in 25-month-old children and adults adhering to the methods of the original studies as
faithfully as possible. The short answer to this question is: yes, we were able to replicate the effect in
adults; and no, we could not find the effect in 25-month-olds. However, the surprisingly high participant
exclusion rates substantially limit the interpretability of these findings and therefore the long answer is
more complicated.
A quarter of the adults and two-thirds of the 25-month-old children had to be excluded because they
did not anticipate that the agent would open the door that led to the box with the ball by the second
familiarization trial. Southgate et al. [13] reasoned that only participants who predicted the agent’s action
correctly in the second familiarization trial understood the agent’s goal, the contingency between the
flash/chime and the following opening of one of the doors, and were also motivated to engage in visual
action anticipation. Following this criterion, Southgate et al. [13] had to exclude one-third of their tested
25-month-olds. In the study by Senju et al. [14], all adults correctly anticipated the agent’s action by the
last of four familiarization trials. Explanations for this striking difference between exclusion rates in the
current and original studies are addressed in the General discussion.
The comparable overall gaze rates between those who passed and those who failed the original
criterion speak against a potential objection that participants who failed the criterion merely were not
interested enough in the task, indicated by reduced attention to the screen. In an exploratory analysis,
we included participants who did not correctly predict the agent’s action in the second familiarization
trial, following a recent study by Wang & Leslie [22]. Yet, this procedure did not change the pattern of our
results. In their study, Wang and Leslie reported that they replicated the effect of false belief-congruent
action anticipation in a group of about 3-year-olds (mean age: 36.3 months) and adults. They used
original stimulus material, but applied different exclusion criteria. Additional to including participants
with incorrect action predictions in the second familiarization trial, they excluded children and adults
who provided too little gaze data when compared with the respective group (three children from the
bottom 5th percentile of total looking time to the doors; 17 adults from the bottom 25th percentile of
total looking time to the doors). After this procedure, in the final samples, 19 out of 27 children and 28
out of 44 adults directed their first fixation towards the correct door in the test trial. These distributions
are only significantly different from chance in a one-tailed binomial test. To be clear, we do not doubt
the appropriateness of these criteria or of one-tailed testing of directional hypotheses. But, considering
that there seemed a need for adopting new exclusion criteria seriously weakens Wang & Leslie’s [22]
evidence for false belief sensitivity in children and in adults.
We further checked whether participants in Experiment 2 attended more to the puppet on the stage
than to the observer whose action they were supposed to anticipate and therefore failed the anticipatory
looking measure for that reason. Yet, we found no predictive relationship between the amount of
fixations directed towards the observer prior to the anticipatory period and subsequent fixations of the
correct or incorrect door. In other words, participants who paid more visual attention to the observer
were not more likely to perform better on the test trial. One motivation for this post hoc analysis was
that there seemed to be an advantage of anticipatory looking procedures that use a self-propelled object,
rather than an agent that hides an object [23–25]. However, evidence for false belief sensitivity observed
in this paradigm does not seem to be overly robust either. For example, 7-year-old neurotypical children
in Schuwerk et al. [25] showed above chance false belief-congruent action anticipations only in the DLS,
but not when first fixations were considered.
A limitation of this replication attempt is a deviation of the original study in the timing of events
during the crucial phase between the audio-visual cue that sought to elicit anticipatory looking and the
to be anticipated action. In both studies, the anticipatory period started with the onset of the audio-visual
cue (chime and flashing of doors) and lasted for 1750 ms. However, our audio-visual cue lasted 2 s and
13
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.5:172273
................................................
not 1 s as in the stimuli by Southgate et al. [13]. An alternative explanation why we failed to replicate
the original findings could be that the time between the onset of the audio-visual cue and the observer’s
action was too long for 25-month-old children to build up an association between the cue and the action
and thus our stimuli were not able to elicit anticipatory looking. Other studies that successfully found
false belief-congruent anticipatory looking in infancy had delay phases (from the cue/disappearance of
the agent to the to be anticipated action) between approximately 2 and 3 s [23,26,27]. However, there are
also examples in the literature in which with such a delay phase no systematic false belief-congruent gaze
behaviour was found [28]. Moreover, in a study by Surian & Geraci [29], the delay phase between the
disappearance and reappearance of the agent was 3.5 s long and here already 17-month-olds successfully
anticipated the false belief-congruent action. To conclude, we argue that it is unlikely that in our study
the delay of 3.75 s was too long for 25-month-olds to learn the association between the cue and the
action and therefore caused the high exclusion rates and the negative finding in the test trial. But, we
cannot completely rule out the possibility that our comparably long interval contributed to the overall
low correct anticipation rates in our experiment.
In sum, together with the current replication attempt, evidence for false belief sensitivity in
anticipatory looking tasks is either absent [28] or present but weak [22,25,30]. In the General discussion,
we address the reliability of our task implementation in comparison to previous studies and the role of
exclusion criteria in anticipatory looking false belief tasks.
4. General discussion
In two experiments, we aimed to replicate Southgate et al.’s [13] finding that 25-month-old children
seem to take an agent’s false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns. With an adult
sample, we further tried to replicate the finding by Senju et al. [14] that neurotypical adults systematically
anticipate an agent’s false belief-based action. In both experiments, we tested the false belief condition of
the original studies (condition FB2 in the original papers), that is closer to classical object transfer false
belief tests [3] and is less open to alternative explanations.
We failed to replicate the original findings in a sample of 2- to 3-year-olds (Experiment 1) and
25-month-olds (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, no significant difference between looking to the
false belief-congruent and the incorrect door was found. In Experiment 2, either no difference, or
a significant looking bias towards the incorrect door was found, depending on the employed gaze
measure. These findings fit well in the bigger picture of a number of other recent replication attempts
of this paradigm [31–33] (for similar issues with other implicit false belief paradigms, see [34–36]).
For example, Kulke et al. [33] could also not replicate the FB2 condition in a large sample of 2- to
6-year-old children. Further, Dörrenberg et al. [31] reported either a non-significant or a significant
looking bias towards the incorrect door in 24-month-olds. Notably, all these studies employed the
original material.
We replicated the original findings with our adult sample (Experiment 2). Our participants showed
false belief-congruent anticipatory gaze behaviour in two out of three employed gaze measures. This
adds to previous positive findings when examining adults with a non-verbal anticipatory looking false
belief task [25,26,37] and might suggest that the phenomenon of false belief sensitivity indicated by
anticipatory gaze behaviour might be more robust in older age groups. A recent longitudinal replication
study by Grosse Wiesmann et al. [32] provides support for the idea that false belief-congruent action
prediction is fragile in infancy, but becomes increasingly pronounced with age. However, our successful
replication with adults has to be contrasted with other recent replication studies that did not find the
effect in adults [38,39]. Taken together, the findings from these recent replication studies cast doubt on
the robustness of implicit false belief sensitivity in children and adults.
Across all experiments, we encountered surprisingly high exclusion rates when the original criteria
by Southgate et al. [13] were applied. Two-thirds of the children and a quarter of the adults failed to
meet the inclusion criteria because they did not look systematically at the door through which the agent
was going to grab the ball. That is, a large number of participants did not seem to build up the correct
action anticipation that was suggested in this experimental procedure. This is worrying and questions
the validity of the employed dependent variables. On logical grounds, we agree with the authors of the
original studies that anticipating the agent’s action at the end of the familiarization phase is a prerequisite
for arguing that anticipatory looking on either door in the test trial is indicative of an action prediction
that took the agent’s belief into account.
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Why did so many of our participants fail to correctly visually anticipate the agent’s action in the
second familiarization trial in Experiment 2? First, this could be due to certain aspects of this replication
attempt, such as methodological differences in our task implementation or sample characteristics. Our
procedure was close to the one described by Southgate et al. (refer to the preregistered replication receipt
and stimuli description at https://osf.io/h5ptd/). Further, our sample of 2-year-olds had the exact same
age as the original sample and it was large enough not to be underpowered [20]. Although the time
interval for gaze data analysis was identical to the one in Southgate et al. [13], we inadvertently modelled
the delay phase between the onset of the audio-visual and the false belief-based action 1 s longer. This
deviation could serve as post hoc explanation for the high exclusion rates of Experiment 2, namely that
the delay between the cue and the to be anticipated action was too long for our samples (especially the
25-month-olds) to learn this contingency. We argue that it is unlikely because this longer time interval
is still comparable to previous research that reported evidence for false belief sensitivity in infancy [29].
Further, also with a shorter delay phase in Experiment 1, we observed these high exclusion rates and no
false belief-congruent looking behaviour in the test trial. Moreover, other recent replication attempts also
had high exclusion rates following the original criterion and could not replicate the original findings,
although they employed the original material and the original delay-phase duration [31–33].
Second, the task itself, not specifically our implementation, could be an unreliable measure of false
belief sensitivity. We argue that our findings, together with findings from previously published studies,
suggest that the paradigm might not elicit belief-based anticipatory looking strongly enough. Rather,
fixations by a considerable number of participants are randomly distributed or driven by some other
cognitive process.
For example, the fact that Southgate et al. [13] had to exclude nearly one-third of the tested children
due to a lack of action anticipation in the familiarization trial (11 out of 35), and that from the remaining
24 another 7 either looked at neither (n= 4, excluded from the final sample) or the wrong door (n= 3) in
the test trial, points in this direction. Moreover, several other studies using this type of task provide no
[28] or weak evidence for false belief sensitivity [22,25,30]. On the other hand, other versions of this
paradigm seem to have been more successful in detecting false belief sensitivity, especially in adult
samples [24,26,37].
Strikingly, the recently fast-growing body of replication attempts of these anticipatory looking
paradigms could not help to elucidate this issue. For example, previous successful conceptual
replications with children and adults [24,25] could in turn not be directly replicated [38]. In sum, the
to date available replication attempts draw a complicated and mixed picture of replications, partial
replications and non-replications [40].
There is, however, evidence on the predictive validity of an anticipatory looking measure from
a longitudinal study which found significant correlations between taking false beliefs into account
in an eye-tracking task at 18 months and explicit false belief understanding at 48 months [23] and
the understanding of moral intentions at 60 months [41], independently of verbal IQ. Moreover, the
anticipatory looking measure was significantly correlated with infants’ performance in a goal-encoding
habituation task [42] at seven months, suggesting coherence among measures of infant psychological
reasoning [41]. These findings seem to indicate that a low-demand anticipatory looking measure may be
valid to capture implicit false belief sensitivity, or some skill relevant for processing beliefs in infants.
Recently, another anticipatory looking paradigm version was published by Grosse Wiesmann et al.
[30] (cf. [27]). In their paradigm, a cat follows a mouse through a tunnel that branches and has two
exits. They measured if 3- to 4-year-old children correctly predicted which exit the cat would take based
on its belief about the whereabouts of the mouse. An advantage of this paradigm is that it consists of
multiple trials (10 familiarization trials, 12 false belief trials, six true belief trials) and might therefore
produce more reliable results. Although evidence for false belief sensitivity is also rather weak (54%
correct false belief trials in 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds), such a paradigm—if independently replicable—
could be promising for future studies using visual false belief-based action predictions as a measure of
individual competence. Apparently, the only anticipatory looking paradigm that has hitherto produced
robust results is the one by Clements & Perner [3]. The false belief sensitivity assessed with this task in
children between 3 and 5 years of age has been repeatedly documented in the same and independent
laboratories [43–46]. Its robustness may be due to children being explicitly told what the story agent is
after, whereas this has to be inferred in Southgate et al.’s [13] version.
Our findings further suggest that exclusion rates should be considered important for research
questions, rather than just being an undesirable hassle during data acquisition and analysis. Different
exclusion criteria used in available anticipatory looking studies [14,22,24,25,28,47] contributed to the
confusion about whether infants, children and adults have an implicit sensitivity to false beliefs or not.
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We are convinced that, for each individual study, the exclusion of participants due to adjusted criteria
may be necessary and justified. But, now that we have a bigger—and scattered—picture of the empirical
basis of implicit false belief sensitivity in anticipatory looking paradigms, it is time to systematically
investigate what the exclusion of children and adults means, instead of ignoring the reasons that drove
their task performance and mentioning in a footnote that high exclusion rates are common in the study
of infants. A systematic evaluation of this issue will advance our understanding of the reliability and
validity of anticipatory looking paradigms to test false belief sensitivity. This, in turn, is a prerequisite
for the development of strong theories on the nature of ToM.
In sum, the present findings, together with findings from previous studies, demonstrate that the
reliability of replications of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms poses a serious challenge for ToM
infant research. It seems that subtle differences in the implementation of anticipatory looking false belief
tasks have a large impact on the obtained results. We do acknowledge the importance of painstakingly
taking care that all critical methodological details are re-modelled in replication attempts. Further, we
acknowledge the importance of context in replication attempts. As pointed out by Lucas [48], it can
be argued that replications are even likely to fail because the psychological phenomenon of interest is
dependent on a myriad of contextual factors not covered by the methods description of the original
paper (e.g. laboratory setting, experimenter characteristics, time of the day, mood). But, theory-driven
confirmatory research should be able to form and test predictions on psychological phenomena beyond
such subtle methodological variations and contextual factors. Otherwise, theories—especially those that
are driven by novel and exciting findings—become unfalsifiable.
We conclude that a systematic multi-laboratory replication project, agreeing on one appropriate
anticipatory looking paradigm and standardized data processing, is required to assess the reliability of
measuring implicit sensitivity to beliefs without the help of a verbal story in infants, children and adults.
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